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  For most Americans, attending religious services is a routine and important part of life. On an 
average Sunday roughly one-fourth of the U.S. population attends religious services, and roughly half of 
the population attends religious services at least monthly.
1  Donations to churches and other religious 
organizations make up a plurality (and by some estimates a majority) of charitable contributions 
(Andreoni, 2006).  Over two-thirds of Americans belong to a church or other religious organization 
(Iannaccone, 1998). Despite the broad reach and clear importance of religious observance, there has been 
relatively little progress in measuring how church attendance shapes the choices people make and the 
attitudes they hold.  
There are strong correlations between the degree of religious observance and a wide variety of 
pro-social behaviors and positive health outcomes. For example, there is a well-known positive 
association between attending religious services and political participation; those reporting regular church 
attendance are much more likely to vote (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995).  Prior work has found that, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, age, gender, and political 
conditions, those who report attending church weekly are between 10 and 15 percentage points more 
likely to vote, a difference roughly equal to the gap in turnout between a presidential and non-presidential 
year. 
It is unclear how these correlations between religiosity and various outcomes should be 
interpreted. Do these associations measure the causal effect of church attendance, or do they capture long 
and short run differences in those who choose to attend church and those who do not? In the case of 
church attendance and voting, it is quite plausible that a person who enjoys participating in church life (an 
activity which involves listening to speeches, meeting with others, volunteering, and organizing) would 
also enjoy participating in politics. Short-run factors may be at work as well. Those who are new to an 
area may have less religious involvement and it is well established that on average newcomers are less 
                                                 
1 Figures based on calculations of GSS data from 1973 to 1998.   2
likely to vote. A larger point is that any catalogue of particular conjectures about how church goers may 
differ from non-church goers runs the risk of overlooking important sources of difference.  
We measure the causal effect of church attendance by observing the consequences of the decline 
in church attendance that followed a policy change. In recent decades, long-standing restrictions on 
Sunday retail activity, often referred to as “Blue Laws,” were repealed. In a recent paper, Gruber and 
Hungerman argue that a consequence of permitting Sunday morning shopping was to reduce the relative 
appeal of Sunday morning church attendance.  They provide compelling evidence that there was a notable 
decline in church attendance following the repeal (Gruber and Hungerman, 2008).  
We extend this earlier work to examine whether the repeal of the “Blue Laws” was also 
associated with a decline in voting in presidential and mid-term elections, which is what is predicted to 
occur if church attendance promotes political participation.  We find that the repeal of the Blue Laws 
resulted in an approximately 1 percentage point fall in the percentage of the population that turns out to 
vote. Additionally, there is little evidence that repeals in Blue Laws were preceded by declines in voter 
participation or declines in religious participation; the results here are not driven by “reverse causality.”  
We thus conclude that the relationship between Blue Laws and voting plausibly operates through Blue 
Laws’ impact on religious attendance.  The findings here therefore provide much more compelling 
evidence of a true relationship between attendance and voting than does prior research. We also examine 
whether there are any partisan differences in the effect of the Blue laws’ repeal. We find that the decline 
in turnout appears to affect Democratic but not Republican vote shares, a result we present in section 3 
and briefly discuss in the conclusion.  
These findings have implications for the larger question of how citizen engagement in voluntary 
associations affects society. Citizen involvement in religious organizations, unions, civic groups, and 
clubs is often credited with creating networks of communication and fostering trust and reciprocity among 
members of society. The “social capital” created by such organizations is cited by some as an important 
determinant of the quality of political and economic performance and therefore a decline in citizen 
involvement in such activities has serious and broad consequences (e.g., Putnam 2000). Robert Putnam, a   3
leading proponent of the view that the level of social capital plays a critical role in societal performance 
along many dimensions, argues that religious organizations are of special importance:  “Faith 
communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social 
capital in America.” (Putnam 2000, 66). Concern over a decline in church attendance is premised on the 
belief that churchgoing causes rather than is merely associated with increases in social capital. More 
generally, if church attendance is determined to have a causal effect on political participation, this would 
provide a valuable example of how participation in voluntary organizations does in fact have a causal 
effect that spills over into the political sphere as social capital theorists maintain.  
Establishing whether church attendance has a causal effect on participation also has implications 
for our understanding of mass politics and for evaluating the full range of consequences that follow from 
public policy toward religious organizations. For instance, one important feature of churches is that their 
membership is not concentrated among the highest socioeconomic strata, and so, if it was real, the 
mobilizing effect of church attendance might counteract some of the class biases observed in political 
participation (Brady, Schlozman, Verba, and Luks 2008).  
Our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 reviews the literature linking religiosity and political 
behavior. Section 2 discusses the history of Blue Laws and the identification strategy. Section 3 presents 
the estimation results. Section 4 discusses the implications of our findings, some of their limitations, and 
directions for future investigation.  
 
Section 1. Literature Review 
There is a large body of work documenting correlations between church attendance and various 
pro-social behaviors. In particular, attending church has been linked to: lower levels of criminal activity 
(Evans, Cullen, Dunaway and Burton, 1995; Lipford, McCorkmick, and Tollison, 1993; Hull and Bold, 
1995), lower rates of delinquency (Bachman et al. 2002; Johnson et al 2000.; Wallace and Williams, 
1987), lower rates of substance abuse (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2001), better 
health status and outcomes (Levin and Vanderpool, 1987; Hummer, Rogers, Nam, and Ellison, 1999),   4
improved self-reported measures of well-being (Ellison, 1991; Hout and Greeley, 2003), and greater 
marital stability (Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993). Religiosity is strongly correlated with self-reports of well-
being (Ellison 1991, Hout and Greeley 2003), and recent work has found that differences in those 
reporting never attending to attending church weekly is comparable to the boost in happiness from 
moving from the bottom to the top income quartile (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002).  
Voter turnout is also strongly associated with religious observance. There is a robust and large 
positive association between turnout and a citizen’s frequency of church attendance. Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) pool survey data from several decades of American National Election Studies and regress 
turnout on reported church attendance and a collection of additional variables, including age, income, 
gender, and education. They estimate that those who report attending church every week or almost every 
week are 15.1 percentage points more likely to report voting in presidential election and 10.2 percentage 
points more likely to report voting in mid-term elections than those who say they do not attend religious 
services (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, Tables D-1 and D-4). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
perform a similar analysis, predicting turnout in a larger set of elections. Using the data from the 2,500 
respondent Citizen Participation Study survey, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady confirm the strong 
correlation between church attendance and turnout (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Other research 
has focused on the relationship between church going and turnout for particular ethnic or racial 
subgroups. A positive relationship between religious participation and voting has been demonstrated for 
Asian Americans (Wong et al, 2005), Latinos (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001), Muslims (Jamal, 2005), and 
African Americans (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh, 2001).  
There are two main explanations for how church attendance might cause greater voter turnout. 
First, participation in a church builds civic skills and thereby increases a citizen’s interest in and capacity 
for participation. Church goers are exposed to a basic political education through political information 
from other members and the clergy. Those who attend church participate in decision making processes 
regarding church affairs, plan meetings, or give speeches. These activities help develop general civic 
skills that might lead to political involvement outside of church. Second, church members are easily   5
mobilized. Church members are part of a community and may be relatively easily encouraged to 
participate by requests from other church members or the church leadership. These requests may be 
especially effective due to social pressure to participate in political causes that are of common concern.  
Recent work in voter turnout provides evidence to support both of these channels. For example, 
turnout behavior appears to be relatively malleable. Randomized assignment field experiments have 
shown that some common mobilization tactics, such as pre-election door to door canvassing, can increase 
turnout substantially (Gerber and Green, 2000). The initial study in the most recent wave of scholarship, 
conducted in New Haven in 1998, showed an 8 percentage point average treatment on treated effects and 
results of this magnitude have been supported by most subsequent studies of canvassing (Green and 
Gerber, 2008). Encouragements to vote might be delivered personally by church members and so might 
be similarly effective.  
Moreover, voter turnout appears to be highly sensitive to even small amounts of social pressure. 
Members of a church congregation are likely to be reminded about the upcoming election during church 
services, with the clear implication if not the explicit injunction to vote. The social pressure exerted by the 
public encouragement to adhere to the social norm of voting may be effective at increasing turnout. 
Recent experimental studies on the effect of social pressure on voter turnout confirm earlier work in 
social psychology showing that social pressure can induce compliance with behavior that is supported by 
social norms (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Cialdini and Trost 1998, Scheff 2000 ). In a recent field 
experiment, Gerber, Green, and Larimer examined the effect of different pre-election mailings on the 
probability a subject voted. Two of the mailings reminded voters that whether they voted or not is a 
matter of public record. They found these mailings caused over a 5 percentage point increase in the voting 
rate, approximately 10 times the effect of a typical political mailing (Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008). 
Other experimental work has shown that the more personal an encouragements to vote is, the more 
effective it is at producing higher turnout  (Gerber and Green, 2000; Green and Gerber, 2004).   
At the same time, efforts to measure the causal effects of church going are hampered by the non-
random nature of differences in church attendance across individuals.  While church attendance may be   6
causing the higher turnout reported in these studies, it is also possible that those who are more likely to be 
politically active are the very individuals who attend church.  For example, individuals may have a fixed 
desire for social participation that extends to all arenas, including both political and religious 
participation.  In such a case, the positive correlation observed in other studies may reflect this omitted 
third factor.  This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the most influential work examines 
correlations between survey measures of church attendance and turnout. Survey work suffers from 
various forms of measurement error. If those who attend church or report they attend church also 
exaggerate their pro-social behavior, the relationship between religious attendance and pro-social 
behavior will tend to be biased upward.  
While aware of this difficulty, scholars who specialize in political behavior routinely interpret the 
correlation between church-going and turnout as evidence church attendance causes turnout. Researchers 
minimize the problem of drawing causal conclusions in this area or assume that the available control 
variables were adequate to eliminate concerns (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, p172, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1993; Verba, et al 1995).
2 However, some differences between churchgoers and others (such as 
tastes for organizational involvement or listening to sermons and speeches) may be difficult to observe, so 
that adding control variables will not fully address whether the association between attendance and voting 
reflects these omitted factors. Some more recent work is agnostic about whether the correlation between 
church attendance and voting ought to be interpreted as causal. A review of survey evidence 
demonstrating the strong positive association between church attendance (as well as union membership) 
and political participation concludes that “much more work is needed to determine whether the “effects” 
we find are simply the result of confounds (such as the possibility that those with a sense of duty are more 
                                                 
2  Verba et al. for instance discuss the possibility of spurious correlations at length, but ultimately dismiss the 
plausibility and relevance of the typical objections to ascribing a causal interpretation to the association between 
institutional involvement and political activity. They note that empirically it is not simply being affiliated with an 
institution, but how actively the individual is engaged that matters for political participation (p279). This argument 
does not address the possibility that a taste for participation is expressed in both the extent of involvement in 
institutions, on one hand, and the extent of involvement in politics, on the other.  
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likely to join both churches and unions and such people also participate in politics at higher rates) or real 
mechanisms...” (Brady, Schlozman, Verba, and Luks, 2008).  
The strategy that we will pursue in this paper is to use a policy change, repeal of the Blue Laws, 
as a shifter of religious participation that may impact voting.  Several recent studies have used policy 
changes to study voter turnout. Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopolous (2004) measure the 
effect of education on voter turnout using the change in educational attainment caused by compulsory 
education laws and changes in child labor laws. They conclude that education has a positive effect on 
voter turnout in the United States, a result in agreement with the results of previous cross sectional 
regression using the American National Election Study and the Current Population Survey.  
 
Section 2:  A Brief History of Blue Laws 
  This section provides some background on Blue Laws in the United States.  For more 
information, readers should consult Goos (2005), Laband and Heinbuch (1987), and Gruber and 
Hungerman (2008).    
Blue Laws, also called Sunday closing laws, are laws which restrict various activities on the 
Sabbath.  Such laws have been fairly common throughout the nation’s history.  All of the original 
colonies had Sunday closing laws, and every state had at least some law prohibiting certain activities on 
Sunday. By the mid 1900s, over 30 states had laws prohibiting retail activity on Sundays.  These laws 
frequently prohibited “labor” or “all manner of public selling,” but often made exceptions for acts of 
charity.
3  It is these general statewide prohibitions on retail activity which will be the focus here. 
In 1961 the Supreme Court issued a key decision regarding the constitutionality of Blue Laws in 
the case McGowan v. Maryland.  The court upheld the constitutionality of Blue Laws, but stated that Blue 
Laws could be found unconstitutional if their classification of prohibited activities rested “on grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”  After the ruling, Blue Laws began to be 
                                                 
3 States sometimes also exempted certain retail activities, for instance by allowing pharmacies to stay open on 
Sunday.    8
challenged on the basis that they failed this constitutional test (Theuman, 2005).  These challenges were 
often successful since Blue Laws could be confusing in their classification of what activities were allowed 
and what activities were not.  For example, in Texas it was possible to sell hammers, but not nails, on a 
Sunday (King, 1985).  In the decades following this ruling, most states repealed their Blue Laws either 
through judicial or legislative action (Goos, 2005).   
To study these laws, we gathered information on each state’s Blue Laws from the 1950s until the 
present.  We identified states that witnessed a discreet and significant statewide repeal in the prohibition 
of retail activity on Sundays.  Some states’ laws were (or are) decided at the county or city level, making 
collection of these data infeasible.
4  A few states were not used because we could not verify the exact time 
that the laws were repealed, or because the states gradually added exceptions to their laws over time, 
making it difficult to assess in any particular year whether the laws in place could be regarded as 
effective.
5  Eight western states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 
and Wyoming) never had any retail Blue Laws during this time period.  Since these states do not directly 
contribute to identification in the results that follow, one would hope that their inclusion is irrelevant.  We 
investigate whether the results are sensitive to including these western states below.  
Panel A of Table 1 lists the usable states and the year when their laws were repealed, either by 
judicial action or act of the legislature.   The states with usable laws make up a fairly diverse group.  
While there are relatively few states in the west and in New England, we nonetheless have state 
representation in all areas of the country, and there is no clear pattern in the timing of when laws are 
repealed in any given part of the country. 
Even if the collection of states appears reasonably diverse and the timing of repeal appears 
nonsystematic, there are a few other important questions concerning the use of these laws.  First, one may 
wonder if these laws were enforced before their repeal.  If they were not enforced, then their repeal would 
                                                 
4 These states include Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii , Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. 
5 These states include Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, New York, West Virginia, and Wisconsin   9
not have an effect on religious or voting behavior and this will bias us away from finding an impact of 
these laws.  Fortunately, we were able to uncover newspaper stories and other evidence indicating the 
significance of changes in the laws for a number of states (e.g., Merry, 1983; McGee, 1991; Hansard, 
1985; The New York Times, 1970; and the Associated Press, 1984).  
Second, one may wonder whether the timing of Blue Laws’ repeal is coincident with other 
phenomena.  For example, it might be the case that declining levels of civic participation lead to the laws 
being repealed.  We address this concern in the empirical section of the paper.  But fortunately it appears 
that the phenomena contributing to a state’s repealing its Blue Laws are varied and state-specific.  Some 
states repealed their laws only after court battles that lasted years.  Other states changed their laws by 
legislative action without court involvement.  
 It is also hard to generalize about the role of special interest groups in repealing Blue Laws.  
Retail establishments in the same state sometimes supported Blue Laws and sometimes did not.  Support 
for the laws could vary even among similarly-sized businesses in a state (Barmash, 1986), although small 
businesses were more likely to support the laws (Laband and Heinbuch, 1987).  Labor unions have both 
supported and argued against Sunday closing laws (Merry, 1983).  Price and Yandle (1987) investigate 
what economic and social forces are associated with the repeal of these laws. After considering the share 
of women in the workforce, the presence of labor unions, a state’s political makeup, and various other 
state socioeconomic characteristics, they do not find any covariates consistently associated with the 
presence of Blue Laws.   
In sum, we focus on states where we can identify a significant change in statewide prohibitions of 
retail activities on Sunday; these laws create immediate and significant changes in the opportunity cost of 
religious participation.  A number of diverse states have witnessed such a change; there does not appear to 
be any systematic pattern in the timing or location of the law changes in these states.  Prior research has 
failed to identify social or economic factors that are consistently related to Blue Laws’ repeal, and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the factors leading to a state repealing its Blue Laws are varied.  All of 
this suggests that changes Blue Laws create an empirically attractive change in the opportunity cost of   10
religious participation. 
 
Section 3:  Specification and Results 
  This section presents empirical results on the impact of Blue Laws’ on church attendance and 
voting.  We begin first with a discussion of Blue Laws and attendance, using data from the GSS. 
A.  GSS Data and Empirical Methods 
  Our empirical analysis begins with examining Blue Laws’ impact on religious attendance.  To 
carry out this analysis, we turn to the General Social Survey (GSS), the longest-running national survey 
that gathers data on religious participation.  In most years since 1972, this survey has asked a sample of 
1,500 to 2,500 respondents about their frequency of religious attendance.   There are nine possible 
responses to this question: never; less than once per year; about once or twice a year; several times a year; 
about once a month; two to three times a month; nearly every week; every week; and several times a 
week.  We start by simply using the linear index formed by these responses (with values 0 through 8); 
given that each interval represents roughly a doubling of attendance frequency, this is akin to a log scale.  
We also convert answers into estimated weeks of annual attendance (so for example we estimate that a 
person who attends every week attends 52 times a year). 
  Our sample covers the years 1973 to 1998.  We consider individuals in the states with usable Blue 
Laws data listed in Table 1 (including western states which never had Blue Laws).  We limit the sample 
to individuals who report their “religious preference” as Catholic or Protestant, as these individuals are 
those most likely to attend services on Sunday (these individuals make up nearly 90 percent of the 
sample).
6  Additionally, we drop data from a given state in the year the law changed (as it is not clear how 
to categorize such cases).   
 Panel B of Table 1 reports the means of selected variables of interest from the GSS.  The average 
value of our attendance index, which ranges from 0 (never) to 8 (several times a week) is slightly above 4, 
                                                 
6 We have also tried examining the effects of Blue Laws on Jews, for whom Blue Laws should not matter since their 
day of worship is not Sunday.  The estimates were insignificant as expected, but the sample was too small for the 
results to be regarded as reliable.    11
which corresponds to monthly attendance.  (Monthly attendance is also the median response.)  The table 
also shows that GSS somewhat over-samples female respondents.
7   
  We use these data to estimate models of the form 
ijt jt ijt jt j t AL a w sXZ δ βγφ υ ε =+ + + + +  
where Aijt is religious attendance for individual i in state j in year t;  jt Laws  is an indicator for whether the 
Blue Laws are still in place in state j in year t; Xijt is a set of characteristics of the individual i (age, age 
squared, gender, dummies for race, dummies for educational attainment, and a dummy for being married); 
Zjt is a set of state/year control variables (state percent black, state percent foreign born, inflation-adjusted 
per-capita disposable income, and the statewide rate of insured unemployment);  j φ  is a set of state 
dummies;  and  t υ  is a set of year dummies.  This “difference-in-difference” equation thus assesses 
whether repealing the Blue Laws causes a deviation from a state’s mean of participation relative to other 
states at this time.  Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we cluster our standard errors at the state level. 
  The results from this analysis are presented in Table 2.  The first column shows our basic 
difference-in-difference regression for the religious attendance index.  There is a statistically significant 
negative effect on religious attendance of Blue Law repeal.  The result indicates that repealing the Blue 
Laws reduced attendance by 0.25 index points, a little over 5 percent of the sample mean.  This is a 
sizeable effect: it is half as large as the well-noted higher rate of religious attendance for married 
individuals, for example.  The rest of the column shows selected coefficients on other control variables; 
they are as expected.  
  Column 2 reports estimates when the dependent variable is estimated weeks of attendance per 
year.
8  We find that on average Blue Laws’ repeal reduces attendance by a few weeks a year.  The 
average number of estimated weeks of attendance is about 30, so the 2-week impact estimated in column 
2 is about 6% of the mean.  Since Blue Laws likely impact “marginal” churchgoers more than others, the 
                                                 
7 We compared data on observable characteristics such as age and gender in the sample of states used in the 
regressions to the sample of states excluded. The means were generally similar. 
8 For these results we estimate that individuals in the highest attendance category attend twice a week.   12
2-week estimate likely understates the drop in churchgoing observed by those affected by the repeal 
(although, with a repeated cross-section of data like the GSS, we cannot formally verify this).  Both 
columns 1 and 2 point to a non-negligible impact of Blue Laws on attendance.   
  The last two columns test our estimates for reverse causality.  In these columns we include in the 
model a dummy that goes from zero to unity starting two years before a state repeals its Blue Laws.  If 
Blue Law repeal is just picking up a pre-existing reduction in demand for church-going, then this should 
be captured in this “lead” term.  In fact, the lead term is insignificant, and our estimated effect of the Blue 
Laws is in all cases unchanged.  The results here thus show that the repeal of Blue Laws led to a 
statistically and economically significant decline in religious attendance.  In the next subsection, we see if 
Blue Laws repeal also lead to a decline in voter turnout. 
 
B.  Specification and Estimation of Voting  
  In this section we examine how changes in Blue Laws and the resultant decline in religious 
participation impacts voter turnout.   We use county-level data on voter turnout; the unit of observation is 
thus a given county in a given year. Our key dependent variable is voter turnout for presidential elections 
between 1952 and 2000.  The regression we estimate is: 
ct ct ct c ry turnout repeal X δ βφ θ ε = ++ + + . 
Here   ct turnout  is the percent of the population voting in the presidential election in year t for county c, 
ct repeal is a dummy that equals unity if a state has repealed its Blue Laws (and zero otherwise), Xct is a 
matrix of regressors, and the terms  c φ  and ry θ  are county and region-by-year dummies.  We will measure 
ct turnout  in both levels and logs.  The key coefficient is δ , which captures how a change in Blue Laws 
(and thus the opportunity cost of religious participation) impacts voter turnout. 
The regressors in X will help control for other determinants of voter turnout.  These include 
dummy variables for whether senatorial and gubernatorial elections are being held in a given state and   13
year, and the county’s population (in both levels and logs).  The population data come from the Decennial 
Censuses; we linearly interpolate each county’s population for years between the censuses.  We also 
include a measure of whether a state is a “battleground” state: the difference between the share of the state 
voting democratic and the national share voting democratic.  We include the square of this “battleground” 
variable as well.  
The regressions include county-level dummies, so that identification comes from changes within 
counties across time.  The regressions also use a very strong set of region-by-year dummies, where 
“region” refers to the four geographic regions as defined by the census.  These variables thus control for 
any relevant time-varying phenomena for each region in the country.  (Of course, this set of region-by-
year dummies subsumes a typical set of year dummies).  We have multiple repeals of Blue Laws in all 
four regions of the country, meaning that for each region we will exploit within-region variation in Blue 
Laws’ prevalence across time for identification.  
Most of the results which follow will use weighted regressions; this is for two reasons.  First, as 
the dependant variable is essentially a measure of per-capita turnout, more populous counties are more 
informative and this should be exploited to improve the regression’s efficiency.  Second, as shown below, 
the weighted model fits the data better. 
Panel C of Table 1 gives means for some key variables.  As shown in the table, we also have data 
on total votes cast for each presidential candidate; this will allow us to examine how changes in the 
opportunity cost of religious participation affect voter support for members of different political parties. 
Table 3 presents results from our basic regression.  All residuals correct for heteroskedasticity 
and are clustered at the state level.  The dependent variable is the percent of the population voting in 
presidential elections from 1952 to 2000 (in levels).  The first column presents our estimates of the 
baseline specification.  The key coefficient, for whether Blue Laws have been repealed, is negative and 
significant.  The coefficient suggests that the percent of the population voting in presidential elections 
falls by about one point after Blue Laws are repealed.  This is a bit less than 3 percent of the mean of the 
dependent variable; the effect is thus reasonable but significant in magnitude.   14
Comparing magnitude of the effects in Table 3 to those in Table 2 is somewhat difficult since the 
bases are different.  Roughly speaking, we find that attending church about 2.5 fewer weeks per year 
leads to a one percent decline in the odds of voting.  This result is remarkably consistent with Rosenstone 
and Hansen (1993), who find that attending nearly every week raises the odds of voting by 15%.  Our 2.5 
week estimate is roughly one-twentieth of the weeks in the year, and our estimated impact is one-fifteenth 
of theirs.  This result therefore seems compatible with a large but not implausible relationship between 
religious participation and voting.     
Turning to the other regressors, one sees that the senatorial and gubernatorial election dummies 
are both insignificant.  The last two variables capture the role of “battleground” states; the difference in 
the share of a state’s vote for the democratic candidate and the share of the national vote is negative and 
significant; the coefficient for the square of this difference is positive but small and insignificant.  
Together the coefficients suggest that “blowout states” (where the democratic candidate was doing either 
especially well or poorly) have lower turnout than other states.  
The second column reports results from an identical regression except that observations are not 
weighted by county population.  The coefficient is once again negative and significant.  It is reassuring 
that the relationship between voting and the cost of religious participation is similar regardless of whether 
weights are used. As suggested by the R
2, the weighted model fits the data better than the unweighted 
model. 
The third column repeats the baseline estimation but only uses the states where Blue Laws have 
changed; the regression drops western states (listed below Panel A of Table 1) which never had Blue 
Laws.  Since these western states do not directly contribute to the identification of the repeal dummy 
coefficient, their exclusion should not diminish the results.  This turns out to be the case—the repeal 
dummy coefficient in the third column is similar to the coefficient in the first column.    
The fourth column provides a test for whether our results are driven by pre-existing trends.  For 
instance, it may be the case the declining social capital in a state over time leads to less voting, and also 
leads to a change in Blue Laws.  The fourth column tests this story by including an “early” repeal dummy   15
that goes from zero to unity starting the election before a state repeals its Blue Laws; the early repeal 
dummy stays at unity thereafter.  If changes in the laws are driven by pre-existing declines in civic 
participation, then this “early” repeal dummy would be negative and significant, and/or it would attenuate 
the observed effect of the actual law change.  But it is clear from Table 3 that this is not the case.  The 
coefficient on the early dummy is wrong signed, very small in magnitude, and insignificant.  The result 
shows that voting turnout declined immediately after Blue Laws are repealed, not before.
9 
The last column reports results where the dependent variable is logged (and weights are used).  
Once again, the result suggests that an increase in the cost of religious participation leads to a decrease in 
voter turnout.  The coefficient is consistent with a 2.7 percent decline in voter turnout.  As mentioned 
before, the levels result in the baseline regression suggests an effect that is a little less than 3 percent of 
the mean of the dependent variable.  The result is thus extremely similar in magnitude regardless of 
whether logs or levels are used. 
 
C.  Other Results 
We have also estimated a variety of models of the impacts of the blue laws on other aspects of 
voter turnout.  Table 4 shows a series of such regressions.
10  We first report results on turnout for 
contested gubernatorial and senatorial elections between 1952 and 2000.
11  The results for both 
gubernatorial and senatorial elections are qualitatively similar to those on presidential elections in Table 
3, but the standard errors are larger so that the findings are not significant.   
One might also wonder whether changes in the opportunity cost of religion affect different types 
of voters in different ways.  The next two columns look at how Blue Laws’ repeal impacts the percent of 
                                                 
9 One difficulty with interpreting this result is that presidential elections occur 4 years apart, so that a preexisting 
trend may be made manifest between two elections.  However, the results of Table 2 show no evidence of a pre-
existing trend even with higher-frequency attendance data.  This lessens the concern that the regression here is 
somehow masking inter-election phenomena.  
10 These results include a dummy for  whether or not a presidential election was being held. 
11 An election is defined as uncontested if either the Republican or Democratic candidate received above 80% or 
below 20% of the vote.  About 6% of the observations for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections are regarded as 
participating in uncontested elections by this measure.  Results using other cutoffs (or all observations) are 
qualitatively similar.   16
the population voting for Republican and Democratic presidential candidates.  Interestingly, we find that 
the strong negative effect of the blue laws is concentrated in those voting for Democratic candidates, with 
a positive and insignificant effect on voting for Republican candidates. Thus, the “marginal 
churchgoers”—those whose behavior is most likely to be affected by Blue Laws—are relatively more 
likely to vote for Democratic candidates.
12 This finding is consistent with recent work by Brady et al 
showing that the effect of church attendance on voting is greater among lower income voters than for high 
income ones (Brady et al, 2008). 
 
Conclusions 
Several decades of research on political behavior has uncovered a number of strong and robust 
associations between individual experiences on the one hand, and voter behavior on the other. Among the 
most important findings from a generation of research are the strong positive associations between 
individual voter turnout and education, union membership, and church attendance (e.g., Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.). These associations 
have generally been treated as if they were causal effects. However, the foundation for this interpretation 
is weak. Nearly all of the research rests on cross sectional regressions using survey data and in recent 
years voting scholars (among others) have shown greater appreciation for the vulnerability of such 
analysis to bias. This concern is heightened when the independent variable of interest is an individual’s 
choice, such as the decision to attend church or stay in school, which may be affected by unobserved 
individual attributes or circumstances correlated with political attitudes or behavior.     
  The U.S. is a highly religious country and religiosity is correlated with a range of positive 
outcomes. There is increasing interest in converting these correlations into causal interpretations. One 
                                                 
12 Religion has also been linked to political preferences, though attendance has only been a strong predictor of 
candidate preferences since the early 1990s. Since 1992, those who never attend church are much more likely to 
vote Democratic than those who report attending church every week (ANES 2004, Cumulative file).  In contrast, in 
the 1960s, those who attended church regularly were no more likely to vote Democratic than those who never 
attended.  Our result that liberal churchgoers are on the margin is thus compatible with, but does not directly 
substantiate, the observed decline in liberal religious attendance in recent US history.   17
promising strategy for doing so is to find changes in the environment which impact religious participation 
but not other relevant behaviors, and then to trace through the effects on other aspects of life, such as 
political participation. The repeal of the blue laws provides an excellent example of such a change. 
Following Gruber and Hungerman (2008), we show that repeal of the blue laws does indeed lead to less 
church attendance.  We then show that repeal is associated with lower voter turnout, confirming earlier 
studies that documented higher turnout for those who attend church services more often.  
  Beyond this methodological contribution, the finding that church attendance appears to cause a 
change in turnout has important substantive implications for political theory. The “social capital” created 
by citizen involvement in voluntary organizations is often credited with creating networks of 
communication and fostering bonds of trust and reciprocity, which in turn provides an environment 
conducive to high levels of political and economic performance. Theorists for centuries have singled out 
religious practices as of special importance (see, for example, Tocqueville’s extensive discussion of 
religion in Democracy in America), and have noted Americans are religious and conjectured that this 
societal feature has broad implications. Despite this, there have been few previous attempts, and little 
evidence to show, that church attendance actually causes mass behavior (for a recent assessment, see 
Brady, Schlozman, Verba, and Luks 2008).  
  Social capital is sometimes treated as having a uniform influence in civic life, but changes in the 
level of participation in voluntary organizations may have effects that differ markedly across citizens. We 
find that the turnout effects are largest in terms of voting for Democratic candidates. The point estimates 
in Table 4 imply that the net effect of the Blue Law repeal is to reduce the Democratic share of the 
presidential vote by approximately one and a half percentage points. To put this magnitude in context, in 
two of the last eight presidential elections the candidates were separated by about two percentage points 
or less. Organizations such as unions and churches, which reach citizens across socioeconomic strata, 
might serve to mobilize their membership and thereby counteract some of the class biases observed in 
political participation (Brady, Schlozman, Verba, and Luks, 2008). The finding that there are partisan 
implications to changes in the Blue Laws suggests partisan differences across the types of individuals   18
whose church attendance is affected by Blue Law repeal or differences in the strength of their behavioral 
response to reduced church attendance. Clarifying the mechanism that produces the partisan effects is a 
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Table 1:  Blue Laws Information and Summary  
 
Panel A:  State and Year of Repeal 






North Dakota  1991
Ohio 1973
Pennsylvania 1978  
State  Year of Repeal
South Carolina  1985






Washington 1966  
See text for reasons why various states were not included.  Eight other states which never had Blue Laws 
are also included in the regressions: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 
and Wyoming 
 
Panel B:  Summary Statistics on GSS Data 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Attendance  4.2 2.61 
Age  45.9 17.7 
Sex (1= female)  0.58 0.49 
Observations:  16,143. The regression sample includes Catholics and Protestants, and excludes respondents 
surveyed the year a state repealed its laws.   For the basic results attendance is measured by an index (see 
text).  The percent of respondents reporting particular attendance levels are:  Never (10.4) Less than Once a 
Year (8.1), 1-2 Times a Year (13.2), Several Times a Year (13.1), Once a Month (7.7), 2-3 Times a Month 
(9.8), About Weekly (6.2), Weekly (22.6), More Than Weekly (8.9). 
 
 
Panel C:  Summary Statistics on Voting Data 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.
County Population  70,789  260,000 
Percent of Population that Votes  39.6  8.84 
Percent of Population that Votes for Democratic 
Candidate   16.3  5.6 
Percent of Population that Votes for Republican 
Candidate   21.0  7.5 
Percent of Population that Votes for Independent 
Candidate   2.3  3.5 
Total observations: 19,019. Means are unweighted.  Sample includes 1,585 counties from the 1952 through 
the 2000 presidential elections. Data on only 611 and 977 counties are available in 1952 and 1956, 
respectively.     23
 
Table 2: Blue Laws and Attendance 
 
  Index Estimated  Weeks Index Estimated  Weeks
Repeal  Dummy  -0.245 -2.456 -0.242 -2.554 
 [0.094]  [0.963]  [0.087] [1.182] 




Age  0.007 0.17 0.007 0.17 
  [0.009] [0.115] [0.009] [0.115] 
Age squared   0.0001  0.001  0.0001  0.001 
  [0.0001] [0.001]  [0.00001]  [0.001] 
Dummy  for  Female  0.68 7.402 0.68 7.401 
 [0.041]  [0.472]  [0.041] [0.471] 
Dummy  for  White  -0.77 -6.354 -0.77 -6.356 
  [0.240] [2.530] [0.240] [2.528] 
Dummy  for  Black  0.034 1.064 0.034 1.063 
  [0.263] [2.983] [0.263] [2.982] 
Dummy  for  Married  0.505 5.287 0.505 5.287 
 [0.048]  [0.627]  [0.048] [0.626] 
Observations  16143 16143 16143 16143 
R-squared  0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets. All regressions include state dummies and year dummies, controls for 
educational attainment, and controls for state-level income, unemployment, and percent foreign born. Dependent variable 
“index” is a measure of how often an individual attends church, ranging from 0 (never) to 8 (multiple times a week).  
Regressions omit observations in states the year that Blue Laws changed.   The repeal dummy is set to unity once a state 
repeals its Blue Laws.  The Early Repeal dummy is set to unity two years before the Blue Laws changed.   Data are from the 
1973-1998 GSS. 




Table 3: Basic Results 
 
 






No Weights Logged 
Repeal  Dummy  -0.986 -1.224 -1.226 -1.116 -0.029 -0.027 
  [0.573] [0.592] [0.626] [0.589] [0.013] [0.014] 
Early Repeal Dummy  0.261 
 
- - - 
[0.587] 
- - 
Senatorial Election Dummy  0.063  0.324  -0.014  0.055  0.055  0.002 
  [0.189] [0.197] [0.233] [0.194] [0.194] [0.006] 
Gubernatorial Election Dummy   -0.703  -0.737 -0.37 -0.731  -0.731  -0.011 
  [0.703] [0.991] [0.858] [0.728] [0.728] [0.026] 
State Share Democrat  –  National Share (abs. Value)  -15.247  -8.199  -7.335  -15.378  -15.378  -0.355 
  [10.832] [12.445] [14.283] [10.829] [10.829]  [0.310] 
State Share Dem. – National Share, squared  4.375  13.46  -51.467  3.314  3.314  -0.24 
  [57.850] [70.532] [77.210] [58.392] [58.392]  [1.757] 
Weights?  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
County  Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include All Possible States?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Population  Controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-by-Region Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  19019 19019 15618 19019 19019 19019 
R-squared  0.88 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88 
Dependent variable is percent of population voting in presidential election.  Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets.  
Repeal dummy equals unity if a state has repealed its Blue Laws.  Early repeal dummy goes from zero to unity in the election before 
Blue Laws changed, and stays at unity thereafter. States included are given in Panel A of Table 1.  Population controls include county 
population both in levels and in logs.  Year-by-Region dummies subsume a regular set of year dummies.   




Table 4: Additional Results 
 
  Gubernatorial Senatorial  Presidential 
  Levels Logs Levels Logs  Democratic Republican
Repeal Dummy  -0.548  -0.008  -0.77  -0.02  -1.224  0.339 
 [0.758]  [0.033]  [0.632]  [0.019] [0.287] [0.536] 
Weights?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County  Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population  Controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-by-Region Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  19243 19243 22178 22178 19019 19019 
R-squared  0.91 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.86 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, in brackets.  Dependent variable in the first four columns is 
the percent of population voting in either a gubernatorial or a senatorial election.  Regressions in the first 
four columns omit “uncontested” elections; an election is defined as uncontested if either the Republican 
or Democratic candidate received above 80% or below 20% of the vote; results using other cutoffs are 
qualitatively similar.  Repeal dummy equals unity if a state has repealed its Blue Laws. See Table 2 for 
more details.  The dependent variables in the last two columns is the percent of the population voting for 
the Democratic and Republican candidate in presidential elections.   
 
 